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Abstract 
         This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. (Master of Laws) in 
Transnational and European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration & Energy Law at 
the International Hellenic University.  
         The objective of the present thesis is to critically assess the effectiveness of the 
enhanced concept of ‘Centre of Main Interests’, commonly referred to as COMI, as 
amended by EU 2015/848 Recast Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. To that 
effect, reference shall be made to the evolution of the concept throughout EU law, 
especially by way of comparison to its previous form under Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 
on Insolvency Proceedings, as well as to landmark cases of ECJ case-law that shaped 
its interpretation.  
         Furthermore, the thesis addresses the impact of the amended COMI upon 
bankruptcy forum shopping within the Union and identifies the most significant reforms 
brought onto the latter by the Recast Regulation. Finally, it discusses the ambitious 
prospects that emerge with regard to ‘legitimate’ COMI shifts in the context of efficient 
debt-restructuring procedures, which –as such- can effectively evade the preventive 
scope of EU Insolvency Law. 
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Introduction 
 
         Transnational business activity constitutes a significant driving force on economic 
integration and market unification within the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
insolvency of undertakings engaged in cross-border operations can inhibit the proper 
functioning of the internal market. It should be noted that before the advent of the EU 
Insolvency Regulation1 (hereinafter the EIR), cross-border insolvencies triggered a 
complex legal situation wherein insolvency proceedings were opened in multiple 
jurisdictions, therefore different bankruptcy laws came to apply on a sole debtor. The 
legal uncertainty and variability resulting from a situation as such, had detrimental 
effects upon the interests of creditors located in different Member States, as their lawful 
protection would vary from one jurisdiction to another. As aptly portrayed in the Report 
on the proposal of the Regulation “while the EU has been active in its promotion of a 
successful European economy, it has been rather fruitless in the creation of European 
insolvency legislation”2. 
        The situation becomes even more dysfunctional when insolvent undertakings 
intentionally manipulate their corporate seat –thus their bankruptcy seat- in the hope of 
availing themselves of ‘debtor-friendlier’ insolvency law regimes. The need for 
preventing this practice, commonly known as forum shopping, has always been one of 
the main objectives of EU Insolvency Law. In particular, bankruptcy forum shopping 
has always been viewed as a ‘thorn’ in the sides of cross-border insolvencies, the 
“removal” of which is highly unlikely, at least for as long as substantive differences 
among national bankruptcy laws exist. The lack of substantive harmonization of 
national insolvency regimes is not only the number one incentive, but also a sine qua 
non prerequisite for forum shopping within the Union.  
        In this context, the place where a given undertaking conducts the administration of 
its interests and manages its operations, referred to as ‘Centre Of Main Interests’ or 
COMI3, becomes a particularly relevant concept in EU Insolvency Law. COMI 
represents the insolvent corporation’s bankruptcy seat and therefore determines the 
competent forum for opening main insolvency proceedings. Subsequently –if not more 
importantly- it also determines the applicable insolvency law (lex fori concursus) which 
effectively governs all the debtors’ assets irrespectively of their location, thus enjoys 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, OJEU I.160/1 
2Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market on the proposal for a Council 
Regulation On Insolvency Proceedings of 23 February 2000, A5-0039/2000, p. 9.  
3 For the definition of COMI see art. 3(1) of Recast Regulation, infra n. 6 
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‘universal’ application. In this regard, COMI lays into the very core of EU Insolvency 
Law, as it represents the unique criterion for the allocation of international jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy cases having cross-border effects. 
          Nonetheless, the process of formatting COMI as an autonomous EU law concept 
has by no means been an easy task. As a matter of fact, the development of COMI 
proved to be an intense multiannual process4. After several unsuccessful efforts, an 
original version of the COMI concept was formally inserted into EU law by the EIR. The 
introduced concept, however, was criticized as being “too volatile”5 to be actually 
effective in preventing abusive forum shopping, while the absence of a concrete 
definition caused significant disparities in its interpretation by national courts. These 
factors gave room to companies in exploiting the opportunity for “bankruptcy tourism” 
and underlined the need for further improving the concept of COMI.  
         For this purpose, the EU adopted the so-called Recast Regulation6, which 
purports to smooth out the uncertainty of the previous regime by providing a relevant 
definition of COMI. However, certain doubts still remain as regards the actual efficiency 
of the enhanced concept in the pursuit of the objectives set by the Community. This 
skepticism is mainly based on recent corporate practices, which reinforce the 
hypothesis that increased certainty in COMI may serve to companies as a more 
effective “users’ manual” for COMI shifts in the context of bankruptcy forum shopping.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The conflict between national approaches as regards the diverse theories for determining the 
applicable company law, the existing gap between civil and common law jurisdictions in view of using 
legal presumptions versus objective elements in its definition, as well as the effort not to obstruct the 
exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed under EU law, are some of the factors that attributed 
considerable complexity to the concept of COMI. 
5 See Lopucki, L. ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’, Cornell L. Rev. 
(1999) 
6 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency 
Proceedings (Recast) OJEU L 141/19 
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CHAPTER I. LEGAL BACKGROUND ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES 
1. The process towards the adoption of the European Insolvency Regulation  
 
       In contrast to other areas of EU law, cross-border insolvencies involve certain 
inherent particularities that require specialized legal attention. For this reason, the EU 
legislature soon decided to explicitly exclude7 transnational insolvencies from the 
scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention, but form instead a separate convention on the 
recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings. However, as this process proved 
to be a multiannual and quite strenuous effort, the allocation of international jurisdiction 
as well as the recognition of court judgements in insolvencies having cross-border 
effects, were for almost three decades left to the regulatory scope of private 
international laws of the various member states8.  
       In 1980, a decade after the proposal of the first draft for a Bankruptcy Convention9, 
a “Working Party” under the auspices of EU Commission proposed a draft Convention 
on Bankruptcy proceedings, introducing therein a novel connecting factor which bared 
a close resemblance to the current concept of COMI10. At that time, however, the draft 
convention’s revolutionary and rather aggressive11 “universalist” approach, was 
criticized as “extremist” and “impractical”, thus its adoption was directly abandoned. 
The subsequent 1990 ‘Istanbul Convention on Certain Aspects of Bankruptcy’ of the 
European Council, had significantly narrower scope12, yet was not adopted due to 
concurrent difficulties in receiving wider acceptance. Still though, it was the first text 
                                                 
7 See Art. 1(2) of the 1968 Brussels Convention On Jurisdiction And The Enforcement Of Judgments In 
Civil And Commercial Matters (OJ 1972, L 299/32). 
8 Before the adoption of the EIR, transnational insolvencies were operating under the “territorialism” 
approach. See Chapter I.3 p. 6 
9 1970 Draft Bankruptcy Convention, Commission Document No. 3.327/1/XIV, 1970. 
10 Under the draft Convention, the main criterion for allocation of jurisdiction was the debtor´s “centre 
of administration”, the elements of which are closely linked with what is now conceived as COMI. See 
“Report on the Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar 
Proceedings”, signed by Jacques Lemontey. 
11 See Tirado, I. (2015) ‘An Evolution Of COMI In The European Insolvency Regulation: From 
‘Insolvezimperialismus’ To The Recast’, p. 2., and also G. S. Moss, S. Isaacs & I.F. Fletcher (eds.), The EC 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and Annotated Guide, Oxford: OUP 2009, par. 
1.15-1.18. 
12 In contrast to the 1980 Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and 
Similar Proceedings, the Istanbul Convention dealt only with liquidation proceedings and the recognition 
of liquidating acts only under certain circumstances. 
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embodying expressly the notion of COMI13, although it did not provide any further 
guidelines as to its interpretation. 
        A few years later, the persistent efforts of the European Council’s Working Group 
led to the creation of the 1995 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings. Despite its 
noteworthy qualities, this text was once again never adopted, as it was not timely 
signed by all fifteen Member States. Nonetheless, it represents a considerable 
breakthrough in the field of EU Insolvency Law, as it is admitted to be the main 
influence of the EIR and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Furthermore, the Virgos/Schmidt 
Report14 on the Convention offered for the first time a concrete explanation of COMI, 
which -as a matter of fact- has been directly transposed into the recitals of the EIR15. 
Indeed, the said explanation was recognized as the ‘main interpretative tool’16 of the 
current COMI concept, and is acknowledged to be a ‘useful guidance’17 in terms of 
interpreting the EIR by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
        After the said numerous failed attempts, the European Union finally achieved to 
overcome national disparities by striking a long anticipated balance between the 
diverse legal theories and approaches residing within the realms of national insolvency 
laws. On 29 May 2000 the Union adopted the EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR)18, which 
came into effect on 31 May 2002. Although slightly more elaborate, EIR presents 
substantial similarities to the 1995 Convention, as the vast majority of its provisions are 
reproduced in an identical manner19. Upon entering into effect, therefore, the EIR 
became the first Community Law measure to be directly applicable20 on transnational 
insolvency proceedings, wherein the debtor’s COMI is to be found within the Union21. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See art 4 of the 1995 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: “The courts or other authorities of the 
party in which the debtor has the centre of his main interests shall be considered as being competent for 
opening the bankruptcy. For companies and legal persons, unless the contrary is proved, the place of the 
registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of their main interests”. 
14 M. Virgós & E. Schmit, ‘Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’, 6500/1/96, REV 1, DRS 
8 (CFC), 3 May 1996 
15 See Virgos/Schmidt Report supra n. 14 para. 75: “The concept of "centre of main interests" must be 
interpreted as the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis 
and is therefore ascertainable by third parties” which was literally transposed into recital (13) of the EIR. 
16 See Tirado, supra n. 11 , p. 5. 
17 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, ECJ EC 2 May 2006, C-341/04 (Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd), par.1. 
18 Supra n. 1. 
19 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee no. C75/01 of 2000, par. 1.1. 
20 According to recital (8), the EIR is a Community Law measure and as such it shall be binding and 
directly applicable in all Member States. 
21 Except from Denmark which did not adopt the Regulation, see recital (33) EIR. 
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2. Scope and Purposes of EIR 
 
        The EIR came to fill in the legislative gap existing in the area of transnational 
insolvency proceedings, the efficiency and effectiveness of which were crucial for the 
proper functioning of the internal market22. Nevertheless, before the adoption of EIR 
transnational insolvencies were lacking the aforementioned requirements, as 
insolvency proceedings were governed merely by national rules of private international 
law, while recognition of court decisions was highly dependent on the discretion of 
national courts. Against this background, the main purpose of EIR was to enhance the 
efficiency of cross-border insolvency proceedings, by laying down the necessary 
conditions that would ensure legal certainty and predictability across the Union. To that 
effect, the EIR set uniform conflict-of-law rules and established a unified legal 
framework on cross-border insolvencies, within which the jurisdiction, recognition and 
applicable law would be regulated in a uniform, pan-European manner23.  
         The efficiency of cross-border insolvencies required also the effective realisation 
of the insolvent debtors’ assets, through the proper coordination of the concurrent 
insolvency proceedings24. In this regard, the Regulation set out to promote close co-
operation between national courts and enable the exchange of sufficient amount of 
information25. All these provisional measures would however have very limited effect 
without proper community action against forum shopping. The combat and prevention 
of malpractices involving the transferring of assets or judicial proceedings to debtor-
friendlier jurisdictions, was therefore set as one of the fundamental objectives of EIR, 
as explicitly stated in its recitals26. 
         Nonetheless, despite its noble intentions and far-fetching ambitions, the EIR 
suffered from several ‘structural defects’ that ended up hindering the realisation of the 
said objectives. Apart from the ambiguous –thus widely criticized- concept of COMI it 
introduced, the Regulation was significantly restrained in its material scope of 
application; under EIR the sole purpose of insolvency proceedings was liquidation, as 
its scope extended only to collective insolvency proceedings entailing the partial or total 
divestment of the debtor27. The said deficiencies were a constant source of criticism of 
EIR and, inter alia, two of the main reasons that led to its revision. 
                                                 
22 Recital (2) EIR. 
23 Recital (23) EIR. 
24 According to recital (12) secondary proceedings may be opened in any state wherein the debtor has 
an establishment; such proceedings may therefore run in parallel with the main proceedings opened in 
the state of COMI.  
25 Recitals (3) and (20) EIR. 
26 Recitals (4) and (5) EIR. 
27 Recital (10) and Art.1(1) EIR. 
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3. Modified Universalism - The Best of Two Worlds 
 
         Prior to the adoption of EIR, transnational bankruptcies were governed by the 
principle of territoriality. According to this “default rule”28 of national sovereignty, every 
Member State had exclusive jurisdiction over the portion of the insolvent debtor’s 
assets located within their territory. Participation in international judicial cooperation 
was left at the discretion of national courts, which however usually opted for ‘domestic’ 
insolvency proceedings according to their own bankruptcy laws. Therefore, under the 
so-called “territorialism” approach, insolvency proceedings involved multiple fora and 
“widely differing”29 bankruptcy laws, applying simultaneously upon a single -yet 
“multinational”30-debtor. In principle, this traditional approach was severely criticized by 
the majority of scholars31, although there has been also a minority of proponents32. 
         Acknowledging the detrimental effects of territorialism upon the actual efficiency 
of bankruptcies having cross-border effects, initial propositions suggested a shift 
towards the opposite end of “universalism”. In its purest form called “unity”33, 
universalism envisaged the existence of a single bankruptcy forum which, in the course 
of unified proceedings, would apply a single bankruptcy law of universal scope. 
Although adding to the overall efficiency of transnational insolvencies, the utter 
surrender of national sovereignty required under such a holistic approach, rendered 
universalism a highly impractical and rather unrealistic ideal. Nonetheless, the 
prominent advantages34 thereof, offered the EU legislator strong motives to adhere to 
the universalist paradigm, at least in principle.  
          In this regard, the EIR opted for a “hybrid” bankruptcy model which represents a 
compromising solution between the two opposing theories. The so-called “modified 
universalism”35 adopted by EIR moves in principle within the sphere of universalism, 
                                                 
28 See John J. Chung, ‘The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Lesson from 
Maritime Law’, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (2006–07) 253, 262: “Territorialism is the default rule in 
every substantive area of law, including [. . .] bankruptcy”. 
29 Recital (11) of EIR. 
30 As this term is used by A. Dawson. See Dawson, A. ‘Offshore Bankruptcies’, Nebraska Law Review Vol. 
88:317 (2009)  
31 See for example, Donald T. Trautman et al., ‘Four Models for International Bankruptcy’, 41 AM.J. 
COMP. L. (1993) at 575, referring to territoriality as "tyranny”, and Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. 
Katucki, ‘Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings Under Section 304’, 17 BRooL J. INT'L L. (1991) , 
suggesting that territoriality represents  a “sacrifice” of international co-operation.  
32 Lopucki, supra n. 5 
33 Ibid. 
34 Some of the most important arguments in defence of universalism refer to the enhanced legal 
certainty and maximized efficiency in cross-border insolvency proceedings. See (ibid.) LoPucki, supra n. 5 
35 Other authors use the term “controlled universality” in order to refer to the modification of 
universalism by the principle of territoriality, see in particular Belohlavek, A. ‘Centre of main Interests 
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while retaining some elements of territoriality36. In particular, it provides for main 
insolvency proceedings opened in the state of the debtor’s COMI, as well as for 
territorial secondary proceedings that may be opened in any other member state, 
wherein assets of the debtor are located. Main proceedings have universal effect upon 
all debtor’s assets, whereas the effects of secondary proceedings cover only the 
portion of assets located in their jurisdiction. The latter are, in fact, auxiliary37 to the 
main proceedings, but they do offer local courts the chance to participate in the single 
distribution system and ensure the protection of local creditors’ interests.  
         The Regulation’s modified universalism approach opened the path to consistent 
judicial co-operation in cross-border insolvencies, in the hopes of enhancing the overall 
efficiency thereof. Its duplicate structure is built upon a simple choice-of-forum rule, 
based on a single connecting factor; the location of the insolvent debtor’s COMI. In this 
regard, COMI seeks to enhance legal certainty, as it offers a simple rule for the 
resolution of potential (positive) conflicts of jurisdiction.  
        On the other hand, this criterion effectively serves also as a choice-of-law rule; the 
determination of COMI points towards the insolvent company’s bankruptcy seat38, 
which subsequently determines the applicable insolvency law. As a result, potential 
manipulation of COMI can lead to the application of an entirely different law, which, by 
being the lex fori concursus39 will enjoy universal scope. Therefore, COMI shifts may 
work as an efficient ‘tool’ for bankruptcy forum shopping in the hands of insolvent 
companies having cross-border presence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(COMI) and jurisdiction of national courts in insolvency matters (insolvency status)’ International Journal 
of Law and Management, Vol 50 No.2 (2008), at 54. 
36 According to recital (11) EIR, due to the significant disparities existing in EU substantive laws, the 
adoption of a pure universalist approach would not be practical since it would entail considerable 
difficulties in the efficient management of insolvencies having cross-border effects.  
37 Or else “ancillary” proceedings, see Dawson supra n. 30 
38 i.e. the place where main insolvency proceedings shall be opened according to recital (12) EIR. 
39 According to recital (23) of EIR, the lex concursus (law of the forum) encompasses all assets, persons 
and legal relations, determines all the substantive and procedural effects of the insolvency proceedings, 
and governs all the conditions for the opening, conduct and closure thereof. 
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CHAPTER II. SHAPING COMI AS AN AUTONOMOUS EU LAW CONCEPT     
1.  The Real Seat V. Registered Seat Debate 
 
         The question “where shall the company’s seat be?” will most probably receive 
differing answers in the various jurisdictions, depending on the particular theory40 that 
is traditionally applied in determining the place of the company’s seat.  
        Common law jurisdictions support the view that a company shall be governed by 
the law of the state where it has its registered seat. Hence, the so–called “incorporation 
theory” provides a simple and objective rule; the centre of main interests is at the place 
of the company’s registered office, thus the applicable company law is that of the state 
of registration. Under the incorporation theory international jurisdiction in cross-border 
situations is easily determined, for there is no need to endure factual evaluations in 
order to assess the actual location of the company’s activities.  
         It is also supported that the ‘registered seat’ doctrine enables companies to 
relocate freely, simply by moving their registered seat to another jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the incorporation theory promotes efficient corporate mobility within the internal market, 
thus facilitates the exercise of the fundamental freedom of establishment of art. 49 
TFEU41. Nonetheless, this fact is also the main deficiency of the incorporation theory 
with regard to cross-border insolvencies; it not only doesn’t restrict, but actually allows 
bankruptcy forum shopping within the Union. 
       On the other hand, civil law jurisdictions applying the “real seat” theory support that 
a corporation shall be governed by the law of the state where its actual seat is (i.e. the 
centre of management and administration). In practice, this view has proved highly 
problematic, as this doctrine is founded upon a connecting factor for which no general 
agreement exists; in the absence of commonly recognized criteria for assessing the 
centre of administration (i.e centre of main interests), it is quite difficult to determine the 
company’s real seat. Consequently, national courts of different jurisdictions may apply 
different criteria42 for the determination of the company’s real seat, probably resulting in 
                                                 
40 This matter refers to the ‘real seat’ v. ‘registered seat’ debate, existing between common law and civil 
law jurisdictions, respectively. The real seat doctrine was developed in France and applies in most civil 
law jurisdictions of continental Europe., whilst the incorporation theory (registered seat) is mostly used 
in common law jurisdictions. Within the EU, it is applied in the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. 
41 Art. 49 TFEU reads: “Freedom of establishment shall include the right to (...) set up and manage 
undertakings, in particular companies or firms (...)” 
42 Such variable criteria may be the place where the economic strategy of the corporation is determined, 
where its assets are located, where its employees and corporate equipment is, the place where the 
contracts are signed or the national law governing these contracts, the place where the board of 
shareholders’ meetings are held, etc. 
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different outcomes. As it is also pointed out43, they may do so, in their effort to justify ex 
post their own jurisdiction.  
        This situation creates legal uncertainty which has detrimental effects upon the 
efficient allocation of international jurisdiction in cross-border insolvencies. 
Nonetheless, this doctrine presents a significant advantage; since the requirements44 of 
the real seat theory impose certain restrictions to the freedom of establishment, this 
doctrine can effectively inhibit bankruptcy forum shopping. 
        
2.  COMI Under EIR - A Defective Concept  
 
         The development of COMI as an autonomous EU law concept was the result of a 
synthetic process, aiming to strike a balance between the said opposing approaches. 
Since each of the doctrines presents strong and weak points, the creation of COMI was 
formatted according to a dual structure, using elements of both theories45. After all, this 
choice was implicitly dictated by the dual purpose46 of EU Insolvency law; the need for 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border insolvency proceedings, 
while preventing bankruptcy forum shopping within the Union.  
          To that effect, COMI comprises both of presumptions as well as objective 
criteria; the registered seat presumption purports to enhance legal certainty and 
predictability, while the provision of objective criteria as to real seat of the debtor 
enables an ad hoc determination of COMI on a case-by-case basis. In this way, EIR’s 
‘centre of main interests’ concept retains a certain degree of flexibility, which allows the 
adoption of “economically efficient solutions”47 for corporations, without further 
obstructing their corporate mobility across Europe.  
                                                 
43 According to Tirado (supra n. 11), courts tend to “keep proceedings at home”, by interpreting the 
centre of main interests on the basis of a wide variety of facts and circumstances which they consider as 
evidence that the centre of administration is located in their seat. This phenomenon reflects the 
absence of ‘mutual trust’ between courts of Member States which leads to positive conflicts of 
jurisdiction.  
44 In Member states applying the real seat theory, the separation of the registered office from the 
central administration is not possible, because they require that since the real seat of the company is 
located there and is subject to the national company law requirements, the registered office shall be 
there too.  
45 Tirado, supra n. 11. According to Tirado “[T]he existence of both civil and common law jurisdictions, 
with different national systems, explains the combination of a general criterion with presumptions based 
on objective elements”  
46 Recitals (2) and (4) of EIR 
47 Tirado, supra n. 11 (p. 5) 
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         In particular, EIR identifies COMI by focusing primarily48 on a uniform –yet 
rebuttable- presumption. Under art. 3(1) EIR, COMI shall be presumed to be the place 
of the registered office, but only “in the absence of proof to the contrary”. Therefore, the 
rule is that COMI is the registered seat, unless proven otherwise. However, the 
provisions of EIR remain silent as to which specific circumstances and facts can be 
regarded as adequate proof to rebut the said presumption.  
         The only guideline thereof is contained in preamble language and particularly in 
recital (13), which lays down several criteria for the determination of COMI in cases 
where the presumption of art. 3(1) is weak or rebutted. Under recital (13), which 
constitutes a word-for-word transposition of the explanation of COMI contained in 
Virgos/Schmidt Report49, “the centre of main interests should correspond to the place 
where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is 
therefore ascertainable by third parties”. According to Wessels50 this explanation bears 
a “law and economics dimension”, as it places the spotlight onto the perception of the 
debtor’s potential creditors as to where the actual COMI is. After all, creditors should be 
able to calculate a priori the risks of insolvency, as aptly pointed out in the Report51.  
        Nonetheless, regardless of how useful of an “interpretational tool”52 the 
Virgos/Schmidt Report is, it should not be forgotten that the latter does not form part of 
the adopted Regulation. Instead, it constitutes an ‘external’ source of detailed 
explanations and justifications for the interpretation of COMI, without which the latter is 
simply taken out of context.  
       If one would focus merely on the particular excerpt transposed into recital (13) of 
EIR, without having recourse to the rest of explanations contained in the 
Virgos/Schmidt Report, they would come to see that the particular wording alone is 
problematic on at least four points. By using the term “should” instead of “shall”, it 
leaves considerable margin of discretion to national courts in interpreting this concept; 
it doesn’t define which actions constitute the “administration of interests”; by using the 
word “therefore” it focuses on the regularity of the administration rather than on the 
                                                 
48 In contrast, the Recast Regulation on insolvency proceedings, shifts the focus primarily onto the ‘third 
parties’ criterion, whereas the registered office presumption lays in the general background context, see 
infra Chapter III.2  
49 See supra n. 15.  
50 See Wessels, B. ‘International Jurisdiction To Open Insolvency Proceedings In Europe, In Particular 
Against (Groups Of) Companies’, International Insolvency Institute (2003), excerpt from a public lecture 
in Frankfurt available at www.iiiglobal.org 
51 See par. 75 of the Virgos/Schmidt Report where it is further noted that “Insolvency is a foreseeable 
risk. It is therefore important that international jurisdiction (...) be based on a place known to the 
debtor’s potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which would have to be assumed in the case of 
insolvency to be calculated”. 
52 Tirado, supra n. 16 
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perception of third parties (it seems as if the regularity of the administration is what 
makes it ascertainable by third parties); last but not least, it refers to “third parties” in 
general, without specific reference to the insolvent debtor’s creditors -which, however, 
are the ones at stake. 
        For all the above reasons, the Regulation’s ‘centre of main interests’ concept fell 
short of the anticipated results and expectations, while the striking absence of a 
concrete definition53 thereof, raised severe criticism54 as regards its ability to actually 
enhance legal certainty and predictability in cross-border insolvencies. It has been 
further speculated that such an absence of a relevant definition of COMI was probably 
dictated by “fundamental political reasons” and resulted from a “purely political 
compromise”55 attempted intentionally by EIR.  
         No matter what the underlying motives may be, the lack of a concrete definition of 
COMI within EIR rendered the said concept particularly concessive in nature – thus 
subject to indefinite interpretational efforts and ongoing speculations as to its true 
essence. One of the most depictive characterizations thereof belongs to Lopucki56, who 
aptly describes the introduced concept as “too vague and volatile” to be actually 
effective in preventing bankruptcy forum shopping within the Union.  
 
3. The Shaping Of COMI By ECJ Case-Law 
 
        The concept’s deficiencies offered national courts considerable margins of 
discretion in adopting differing interpretations of COMI. Indeed, the lack of a single and 
objective definition could only leave ample room for subjective interpretations 
attempted by national courts57.  
        Most of the times, however, such disparate national interpretations of COMI 
resulted from an intentional effort to “keep proceedings at home”58; within the context of 
lack of ‘mutual trust’59 between EU jurisdictions, national court would strive to prove 
that COMI is at their seat, in order to justify ex post their own jurisdiction for opening 
main insolvency proceedings. To that effect, national courts had often recourse to 
                                                 
53 It is indeed a matter of paradox, that such a novel concept was introduced within EU law without 
being accompanied by a relevant explicit definition; neither art. 2 (‘definitions’), nor art. 3 (‘international 
jurisdiction’) of EIR actually define what COMI is. 
54 Belohlavek refers to such an absence as being “a serious deficiency of the Regulation”. See Belohlavek, 
supra n. 35 
55 Ibid, at 69, 70. 
56 See Lopucki, supra n. 5 
57 See Kastrinou, A. ‘Forum Shopping under the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings’, 24(1) Intl. Co. 
& Com. L. Rev. (2013) p 20. 
58 Tirado, supra n. 11 
59 Such admitted lack of ‘mutual trust’ is the reason of frequent positive conflicts of jurisdiction between 
courts of Member states. 
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various elements and indications for the determination of COMI, which however were 
irrelevant to the concept itself and had very little to do with the objectives pursued by 
EU Insolvency Law60.  
        However, as Tirado points out61, the main problem with the interpretations offered 
is that they failed to focus onto the “third parties” criterion. This view was supported by 
ECJ’s rulings in a number of significant cases, which have effectively shaped the notion 
of COMI into its current form. The two most important rulings as such were handed 
down in the so-called Eurofood and Interedil cases, in both of which the Court made it 
clear that COMI is an autonomous EU law concept; it “must therefore be interpreted in 
a uniform way, independently of national legislation”62.  
 
a. Findings in Eurofood  – the ‘third parties’ criterion 
 
        Eurofood63 is considered to be a landmark case for EU Insolvency Law, as it has 
addressed several concurrent issues64 in cross-border insolvencies and has shaped 
the proper framework within which COMI is to be determined.  
       The case concerned an Irish debtor company, ‘Eurofood’, which was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of ‘Parmalat’ corporate group registered in Italy. Based on entirely 
different criteria for the determination of Eurofood’s COMI, Irish and Italian courts both 
held that they had jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings; the former by 
being the seat of the debtor company (registered office), and the latter by being the 
seat of the parent company (centre of control and economic planning). In view of the 
two parallel main insolvency proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ireland referred the 
case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling that would resolve the conflict of jurisdiction.  
       In Eurofood the ECJ underlined the importance of the third parties’ perception as 
to where the actual COMI of the debtor is. In particular, the Court held that in cases 
                                                 
60 Supra 58. 
61 According to Tirado (supra n. 11 p. 7) “the place of main administration is relevant because and so 
long as it is the place where the relevant third parties would have objectively, without needing to invest 
time and money to determine, thought the COMI to be”. 
62 ECJ, C-341/04, 2006, Eurofood, para. 31; C-396/09, 2011, Interedil, paras. 42, 43 and 44, and also 
Francisco Garcimartín, ‘The EU Insolvency Regulation: Rules On Jurisdiction’ University Autonoma of 
Madrid (2016) para. 5. Therefore, the interpretation of COMI shall belong to the exclusive competence 
of ECJ, as [the Court] is “the final authority in the European Union for the determination of questions on 
the interpretation of E.U. law, including the E.U. Regulation”, see Samuel L. Bufford, ‘Center of Main 
Interests, International Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood Decision of the 
European Court of Justice’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 27 Issue 2 Winter 
(2007) which quotes Gabriel Moss Et Al., ‘The E.C. Regulation On Insolvency Proceedings And Annotated 
Guide’ (2002). 
63 Case 341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813 
64 Although briefly discussed, such significant issues refer to the public policy exception applying to the 
international recognition of foreign insolvency judgements, the issue of fair legal process, as well as the 
very important issue of treatment of group of companies under the EIR.  
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where the parent company and the subsidiary have their registered offices in different 
member states, “the mere fact that [the subsidiary’s] economic choices are or can be 
controlled by a parent company in another Member State”65 is insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of art. 3(1) EIR. On the contrary, the registered office presumption can be 
rebutted only where “factors which are both objective and ascertainable by third 
parties”66 provide evidence that its COMI does not coincide with its registered office. 
Therefore, the viewpoint of third parties plays a decisive role in the determination of the 
debtor’s COMI, as it ensures legal certainty and foreseeability in transnational 
insolvency proceedings67.       
        The ruling on Eurofood proceeds further in identifying such an objective factor that 
is capable to rebut the presumption of art. 3(1) EIR; the realisation of business 
activities by the debtor-subsidiary company. In particular, the Court distinguishes 
between companies actually carrying on business activities at their registered office, 
and the so-called “letterbox” companies68 which lack any actual business activity at the 
place of registration. In the latter case, the presumption of art. 3(1) EIR can readily be  
rebutted from the viewpoint of third parties, as the COMI of the subsidiary actually 
coincides with that of the parent company’s69. 
 
b. Findings in Interedil – the ‘central administration’ criterion  
 
       Building further upon the foundations set in Eurofood, in Interedil70 the Court 
proceeded in determining the relevant factors71, a comprehensive assessment of which 
can identify the debtor’s ‘central administration’ as its actual COMI.  
       The case concerned Interedil, an Italian-based company which had later 
transferred its registered office to the United Kingdom and soon thereafter closed all 
business activity there and was deregistered from the UK register. Following the filing 
for insolvency proceedings in Italy, Interedil challenged the jurisdiction of Italian courts 
on the basis that, since the last place of registration was in the UK, only English courts 
would have such jurisdiction. 
                                                 
65 Eurofood, paras. 36, 37 
66 Ibid. paras. 33, 34, 37. 
67 Ibid. para. 33. 
68 Ibid. para. 35 
69 In para. 30 of the ruling in Eurofood, the Court emphasises that under EIR each debtor that 
constitutes a “distinct legal entity” shall be subject to its own jurisdiction. However, this is not the case 
in ‘letterbox’ subsidiary companies which are in fact empty corporate shells without actual business 
activity on their own. For this reason their COMI is rather to be found at the place where the parent 
company’s COMI is. 
70 Case 396/09, Interedil Srl (in liquidation) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA, 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:671 
71 Interedil. paras. 52, 53. 
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         In Interedil the ECJ highlighted the importance that the location of the debtor’s 
‘central administration’72 has for the identification of its COMI. Elaborating further upon 
the findings in Eurofood, the Court held that a central administration as such may be 
identified by “objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties”73. The said 
requirements of objectivity and third parties’ ascertainability are met, where the debtor 
has made these factors public or at least sufficiently accessible to third parties, i.e. the 
company’s creditors in particular74. 
         Based on the above findings, the Court concluded that the registered office 
presumption of art. 3(1) EIR cannot be rebutted, if it is ascertainable by third parties 
that the company’s central administration is at the same place as the company’s 
registered office. By contrast, the said presumption can be rebutted where “a 
comprehensive assessment of all the relevant factors makes it possible to establish, in 
a manner that is ascertainable by third parties”75, that the company’s actual centre of 
administration is located in a state other than that of its registration.   
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 By this term the ECJ refers collectively to the company’s centre of management and supervision, the 
centre of decision-making and the centre of the management of its interests, see ruling in Interedil 
paras. 51 and 59  
73 Interedil, para. 59  
74 Ibid. para. 49 
75 Ibid. para. 59 
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CHAPTER III.   RECAST REGULATION – A PROMISING REVISION 
1. The Need For Reform   
 
         The decade that followed the adoption of the EU Insolvency Regulation was more 
or less a ‘probationary period’ within which the effectiveness of EIR would be put to the 
test; art. 46 of EIR contained the explicit mandate for its review after 10 years of 
practical implementation76. Indeed, transnational insolvency practices revealed various 
defects and shortcomings of the system which underlined the need for its revision. 
Therefore, in 2012 and on the basis of this provision, the Commission issued a 
Report77 suggesting the reform of the Regulation. The external evaluation of the former 
resulted in the so-called ‘Heidelberg-Vienna Report’78, which provided valuable insight 
regarding the proposed amendments to the EIR.  
        The findings of the said report reached the general conclusion that EIR was all in 
all a “successful instrument” in coordinating EU insolvency proceedings, therefore a 
radical change of its core structure and policies was unnecessary79. However, the 
report identified certain “obvious shortcomings”80 in EIR that called for targeted 
amendments. The core issues of concern were identified in five key areas of the 
existing regime; the not-so-smooth instrumentation between main and secondary 
insolvency proceedings; the current inability of creditors to be aware of an insolvency 
proceeding taking place; the legislative gap regarding group insolvencies; the proven 
ineffectiveness of the ambiguous COMI concept in the battle against forum shopping; 
and, the significantly limited scope of EIR which –unlike several national regimes- 
precluded pre-insolvency and debt-restructuring proceedings from its scope81.  
                                                 
76 According to art. 46 EIR “No later than 1 June 2012, and every five years thereafter, the Commission 
shall present to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee a report 
on the application of this Regulation. The report shall be accompanied if need be by a proposal for 
adaptation of this Regulation”. 
77 See ‘Report from the Commission on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 
May 2000 on insolvency proceedings’, COM(2012) 
78 The EU Commission assigned the universities of Heidelberg and Vienna to perform an external 
evaluation of the Report presented in 2012, the product of which was the so-called Heidelberg-Vienna 
Report. See ‘External Evaluation of Regulation No. 1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings,  
JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4 , prepared by Burkhard Hess, Paul Oberhammer & Thomas Pfeiffer 
available at the official website of the European Commission. 
79 See G. McCormack, ‘Reforming The European Insolvency Regulation: A Legal And Policy Perspective’, 
Journal of Private International Law Vol. 10 No. 1 (2014). As McCormack concludes “[T]he Regulation is 
widely understood to work in practice”.  
80 Supra 78. 
81 For a detailed analysis of the main shortcomings identified in EIR see McCormack (supra n. 79), Amey, 
R. ‘Reform to the European Insolvency Regulation’, International Corporate Rescue – Special Issue, 
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         Based on these findings, on 20 May 2015 the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted the Recast Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings82 (Recast), the 
largest extend of which will enter into force on 26 June 201783. By addressing the 
drawbacks detected in EIR, the Recast sets out to achieve greater results regarding 
the overall efficiency of the EU insolvency system. In particular, it introduces notable 
amendments in the management of transnational insolvency proceedings, which 
provide for the better alignment between main and secondary proceedings, enhanced 
publicity and transparency through inter-connected information flows84, as well as 
explicit rules regarding the recurrent issue of group insolvency proceedings85.  
         Amidst the said “procedural” reforms, the spotlight turns onto substantial issues of 
EU Insolvency law, the recasting of which generates new prospects for the European 
insolvency scene. In this regard, the Recast expands its material scope in order to 
encompass also pre-insolvency proceedings and other debt-restructuring procedures, 
which aim at the salvation of business activity and the promotion of economically viable 
solutions86. Therefore, by shifting the focus off liquidation, the Recast readily moves 
towards the adoption of debt-reorganisation objectives, which respond better to the 
imperative needs of current economic reality. Furthermore, the Recast finally provides 
the long anticipated definition of COMI; although the efficiency of the latter is yet to be 
seen, there is no doubt that it ultimately puts an end to ongoing speculations and 
debates concerning the concept’s interpretation.  
         The said reforms create valid optimism that the new regime will be more efficient 
in the pursuit of the objectives set by the Community, especially when seen under the 
prism of a novel stance taken towards forum shopping. Recast’s explicit mandate to 
combat “abusive” forum shopping hinds not only that a ‘positive’ type thereof exists, but 
more importantly that a forum-shopping practice as such may actually evade the 
preventive scope of the regulation. 
                                                                                                                                               
South Square Articles (2015), and also Bob Wessels, ‘The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 
(Recast)’ Technical note (2015) 
82 Regulation EU 2015/848 –OJ L 141. 5.6.2015 
83 See art. 92 Recast, according to which only 3 provisions thereof will not enter into force on 26 June 
2017. 
84 See art. 83 and 87 of Recast relating to the establishment of publicly accessible insolvency registers 
operating within an interconnected system.  
85The event of insolvency of an undertaking as member of a group of companies is a quite frequent 
phenomenon in the modern world of economy. This issue, albeit forsaken when drafting the EU 
Insolvency Regulation, was examined by the ECJ in the famous ‘Eurofood’ case; the so-called “Eurofood 
doctrine“ for corporate groups has largely affected the relevant provisions of the Recast Regulation. See 
Mevorach, I. ‘Centralising Insolvencies of Pan-European Corporate Groups: a Creditor’s Dream or 
Nightmare?’, Journal of Business Law 468 (2006).  
86 See G. McCormack, ‘Something Old, Something New: Recasting the European Insolvency Regulation’ 
The Modern Law Review (2016) 
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2. Recasting COMI 
 
          Before getting to the gist of it, it should be noted that the Recast did not ‘re-invent 
the wheel’ in terms of COMI; it is more apt to say that the Recast ratified the already 
known findings of ECJ regarding the concept’s interpretation, by literally transposing 
the shaped jurisprudence into EU Law87. In this regard, no radical recast of COMI takes 
place, therefore the opinion88 that the language itself implies more far fetching changes 
than those actually effected by the new regime, might be correct on this particular 
issue89. Indeed, Tirado comments that the amendments purport to “improve the COMI, 
not to do away with it or transform it drastically”90.  Hence, the purpose of the Recast is 
not the drastic transformation of the existing structure in COMI, but rather its 
improvement through consolidation and introduction of several material rules of 
interpretation91.  
           The first important amendment is the introduction of an express definition of 
COMI in the second sentence of art. 3(1) of the Recast, which reads as follows: “The 
centre of main interests shall be the place where the debtor conducts the 
administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third 
parties”. Although resembling92 to the description of COMI as contained in recital (13) 
of EIR, the said definition is freed from the problematic elements of the former. First, it 
states that the COMI “shall” be at the place of main administration, thus leaves no room 
for otherwise discretional interpretation; second, it eliminates the word “therefore” 
existing in recital (13) of EIR, thus requires that such an administration is conducted on 
a regular basis and is ascertainable by third parties93.  
            Furthermore, recital (28) in Recast explicitly states that “third parties” should 
refer especially to creditors and their perception as to the actual COMI of the debtor, 
                                                 
87 Recital (30) of the Recast Regulation is a literal transcription of ECJ’S ruling in the Interedil case, para 
59. 
88 McCormack holds that the changes to EIR are “not as far reaching and fundamental as the language 
might imply” (supra at 86) while Eidenmuller characterizes the revisions as a “modest attempt (...) to 
improve the status quo”, see Eidenmuller, H. ‘A New Framework for Business Restructuring in Europe: 
The EU Commission’s Proposals for a Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation and Beyond’ 20 
Maastricht Journal (2013) 133, 150 
89 It seems that the Recast Regulation may indeed reach farther results in certain areas of reform; such 
areas are the new scope rationae materiae of the regulation and the new approach it takes towards 
forum shopping, in view of the new orientation of EU law towards debt-restructuring objectives. 
90 See Tirado, supra n. 11, p.  14. 
91 Ibid.  
92 In contrast to Tirado’s view (ibid.) who supports that the definition provided by Recast is a literal 
transcription of what was earlier recital (13) of EIR, a careful comparison of the two texts shows that 
there are substantial grammatical differences between them that create a different context of meaning.  
93 By this wording, the definition focuses equally upon the regularity of the activity and the perception 
of third parties, detaching the dependence of the latter from the former. See, by contrast, Chapter II.2 
for a relevant detailed analysis of recital (13) EIR. 
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while providing also that this may require adequate and ‘in due course’ notification of 
creditors regarding potential shifts in COMI. Therefore recital (28) incorporates the 
doctrine of ISA Daisytek94 that interprets ‘third parties’ as referring manly to creditors, 
and Interedil according to which certain publicity requirements ought to be met95. 
          As regards the ‘registered office presumption’, the leading view is that it is has 
been formulated much “stronger”96. Recital (30) in Recast provides enhanced 
guidelines as to when such presumption should be rebuttable. In particular, it 
incorporates an actual excerpt from the dicta in Interedil, which requires a 
“comprehensive” assessment of “all relevant factors” in a manner “ascertainable by 
third parties” (i.e. creditors according to recital 28) in order to revoke the presumption. 
Furthermore, the Recast advises national courts to carefully assess all the relevant 
factors which prove that the debtor’s COMI is genuinely located in their jurisdiction97. 
Hence, it suggests that relevant claims raised by the debtor himself should not be 
taken for granted, without supporting proof98.   
         Another important amendment in Recast is that it expressly acknowledges the 
correlation between the way COMI is shaped and the whip-saw effect on forum 
shopping. In this regard, art. 3(1) para. 2 introduces a ‘look-back’ period on the 
application of the registered office presumption; in particular, the presumption does not 
apply when the registered office has been relocated to another Member state within the 
3-month period before filing for insolvency proceedings. In such an occasion, the 
presumption will continue to apply for the place of the former registered office. 
Consistent with the explicit mandate in recital (29) of Recast, this safeguard reflects the 
effort to prevent “fraudulent or abusive” forum shopping on the part of debtors seeking 
to avail themselves of ‘debtor-friendlier’ jurisdictions.  
3. Revisiting The Purpose Of Insolvency Proceedings 
 
Unlike the EU Insolvency Regulation which focused almost exclusively on liquidation99, 
the Recast places clearly the emphasis on debt-restructuring objectives. In this regard, 
while liquidation formerly used to be at the epicentre of insolvency proceedings, now it 
                                                 
94 Re Daisytek – ISA Ltd and others [2003] All ER (D) 312 (Jul) 
95 C - 396/09 Interedil, para. 49 (supra at 74) 
96 See Wessels supra at 81 
97 Recital (27) Recast. 
98 Recitals (32) and (33) Recast. See also G. McCormack, supra at 86 p. 131 
99 McCormack (ibid) aptly stresses that in EIR liquidation “was considered to be the paradigmatic 
insolvency procedure”. According to art.1(1) of EIR, its scope extended only to “collective insolvency 
proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a 
liquidator”. Keen on the primary purpose of liquidation, the Regulation considered secondary 
proceedings merely as “liquidating proceedings”, while the person administering the insolvency estate 
was referred to as ‘liquidator’ even where his task was not liquidation. 
  -19- 
is just one of the existing options –if not the least favoured one. Indeed, the Recast 
adopts a neutral vocabulary which purports to limit references to liquidation to the 
minimum necessary level; in this context, the term “liquidator” is replaced by the term 
“insolvency practitioner”100 while secondary proceedings are no longer conceived 
merely as  “liquidating proceedings”.  
         Some commentators believe that this ‘crusade’ against liquidation may have the 
opposite results from the purported, as liquidation may ultimately be the “swiftest 
method” for maximizing the economic efficiency of assets101. Some others, however, 
don’t see such far-reaching results within the new stance that Recast takes regarding 
liquidation; in fact, they support the view that the new terminology has merely nominal 
value and psychological dimensions, as it purports to eliminate the negative echo 
transmitting from the term ‘liquidator’102.  
         However, a closer look at the rationale underlying the new terminology indicates 
that the Recast makes a genuine shift towards promoting efficient debt restructuring. 
After all, this purpose is aligned with the general objectives already set by EU law in the 
context of promoting sustainable growth and economic recovery within the Union. As 
McCormack points out103, the Recast should be therefore perceived as part of the 
Europe 2020 growth strategy104, which promulgates the sustainment of economic 
activity and the adoption of efficient solutions for the survival of business. Within the 
same context, the subsequent 2014 Commission Recommendation105 speaks about 
ensuring early-stage restructure and offering “honest” bankrupt businesses a ‘second 
chance’, objectives which are almost identically transposed into the recitals of the 
Recast Regulation.  
          In particular, recital (10) of Recast explicitly states that the Regulation should 
encompass procedures which aim to “promote the rescue of economically viable but 
distressed businesses”106 by providing them a “second chance” in the pursuit of their 
ventures. What is particularly noteworthy regarding this objective is that it purports to 
                                                 
100 See art. 2(5) of Recast wherein the relevant definition of insolvency practitioner is provided. 
101 See McCormack, supra at 86. McCormack believes that sometimes fixating on restructure instead of 
liquidation may have counter effects on the overall economy, as it may distort competition between 
businesses and prevent assets from being allocated to their most efficient use.  
102 See Weiss, M. ‘Bridge over Troubled Water: The Revised Insolvency Regulation’, International 
Insolvency Review, Winter, Vol.24 (2015) 
103 McCormack, supra n. 86, p.121-122 
104 See Communication from the Commission, ‘Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth’, COM(2010). 
105 Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a New Approach To Business Failure And 
Insolvency, Official Journal of the European Union, 2014/135/EU. 
106 Recital (10) of the Recast Regulation bears high resemblance to recital (1) of the 2014 Commission 
Recommendation. 
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sustain business activity, rather than engage in sheer company rescue107. This is 
clearly evident also in recital (11) which brings into the scope of the Regulation 
procedures granting a temporary stay against enforcements actions which could 
“hamper the prospects of a restructuring of the debtor’s business”108.  
          It becomes therefore apparent that the debt-restructuring purposes promulgated 
by the Recast are something more than sheer declarations; on the contrary, they seem 
linked with a general movement of the Community towards establishing more 
favourable conditions for the survival of business, continuance of economic activity, 
and employment preservation.  
          Keen on the pursuit of the said objectives, the Recast extends its scope of 
application to a wide variety of insolvency proceedings which aim in the “rescue, 
adjustment of debt or reorganization”109, whereas the purpose of liquidation seems to 
be “pushed back” at the end of the line110. In this regard, even though the restructuring 
goal is not expressly prioritized above the others, the recasted version of the 
Regulation seems to place the said objective into a rather prominent position.   
           Yet, the most noteworthy accomplishment is the expansion of the Recast also  
to pre-insolvency proceedings, i.e. procedures triggered by the mere likelihood of 
insolvency. As explicitly stated in art.1(1) of Recast, such proceedings have the 
mandate to prevent the debtor’s insolvency or the winding up of business operations. 
Within this ample legal framework, debtors have increased prospects for efficient re-
organization of their business, since they are able to restructure “on a clear day”, 
without even falling into the insolvency status.  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 See Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: A Game of Three Halves’ 32 Legal Studies 302 (2012) 
108 Recital (11) of Recast 
109 Art. 1(1) of Recast 
110 It should be noted that the purpose of liquidation is mentioned last among the objectives pursued in 
insolvency proceedings, as these are listed in art. 1(1) of the Recast. 
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CHAPTER IV. IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FORUM SHOPPING 
WITHIN THE EU 
1. Forum shopping under the COMI perspective 
 
         Under the ‘modified universalism’ system adopted by EU law111, the ability to 
forum shop depends exclusively upon the vulnerability of COMI; therefore, the way the 
latter is formulated entails significant implications with regard to the rise and fall of 
bankruptcy forum shopping within the Union.  
         As previously analyzed112, the introduction of COMI in EIR served mainly the 
purpose of enhancing legal certainty as to the bankruptcy seat of insolvent debtors113. 
At the same time, the initial concept retained intentionally a considerable degree of 
obscurity. In this way, the EIR purported to frustrate potential endeavours for 
‘bankruptcy tourism’ across EU jurisdictions114. Nevertheless, the excessively volatile 
nature of COMI had ultimately results contrary to the said objective. Such a failure was 
mainly linked to the lack of a relevant definition of COMI and the high level of 
interpretational discretion granted to national courts. These factors, combined with the 
lack of ‘mutual trust’, enabled national courts to formulate their own criteria for the 
interpretation of COMI in an effort to grasp onto their jurisdiction115. Within this context, 
‘forum shoppers’ found a welcoming breeding ground for even easier manipulations of 
their COMI116. 
       In response to this ambiguous situation, the primary objective of the Recast was to 
enhance certainty and predictability in the interpretation of COMI. As established 
previously117, the Recast provides a relevant definition of COMI as well as specific 
guidelines for its uniform interpretation. In terms of forum shopping prevention, the 
                                                 
111 See Chapter I.3 
112 See Chapter II.2 
113 See Andrew T. Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defence of Universalism’, MICH. L. REV. 98: 
2177 (2000) p. 2208, where the author praises universalism for its enhanced predictability.  
114 See recital (4) of EIR which aims to discourage parties from transferring “assets or judicial 
proceedings from one Member state to another, seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position 
(forum shopping)”. 
115 See Pottow, John A. E. ‘The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency’, 
Brook. J. Int'l L. 32, no. 3 (2007) p. 811-813 and also Pottow, ‘Greed and Pride in International 
Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests’, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 
(2006), p. 1918-19 
116 In view of the disparities among the ‘national’ interpretations of COMI, debtors could just ‘select’ the 
jurisdiction whose criteria for the determination of COMI were more fit to the debtor’s situation or 
more easily adapted to. 
117 See Chapter III.2 
  -22- 
introduction of the ‘look-back’ period118 is considered as an additional safeguard that 
may effectively stump abusive COMI shifts which place their hopes on the registered 
office presumption119. But is this new formulation of COMI the adequate recipe to 
prevent forum shopping? Could it be that, in the effort to clear the clouds over the 
concept’s interpretation, the Recast Regulation just makes COMI even more vulnerable 
to manipulation? 
         Before discussing such an hypothesis, it is important to note that legal certainty 
through uniform interpretation is imperative for every autonomous EU law concept, 
such as the COMI. In this regard, the voices complimenting the Recast for the 
improvements in COMI have a certain point120. However, enhanced certainty creates 
increased predictability, which might have the exact opposite effects than the ones 
sought in terms of forum shopping prevention. As Pottow puts it, “predictability is a 
necessary prerequisite to forum shopping”121. Although this view was originally 
expressed in regards to the generic side-effects of universalism as opposed to 
territorialism, it does however stress a valid point; enhanced predictability reduces the 
uncertainty costs of forum shopping, which would otherwise be “highly risky” thus 
presumably avoided122.   
         Applying this assumption to the increased predictability of Recast’s COMI -in 
comparison to its previous form under EIR- it is doubtful that the new concept per se 
can be more efficient in forum shopping prevention123. On the contrary, it can be 
argued that the ‘enhanced’ COMI can effectively serve as a “user’s manual”, actually 
facilitating debtors in the execution of forum shopping strategies124. A careful planning 
of a forum selection strategy, based on thorough examination of the –now largely 
clarified- prohibitions and limitations set by the Regulation, together with a timely shift 
in COMI which complies with the ‘look-back’ requirement, and especially after using the 
                                                 
118 Art. 3(2) of Recast, analyzed previously at Ch. III.2  
119 See recital (31) of Recast stating that the registered office presumption “should not apply where (...) 
the debtor has relocated its registered office (...) within the 3-month period prior to the request for 
opening insolvency proceedings”.  
120 See for example Richard Tett and Katharina Crinson, ‘The Recast EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings: A Welcome Revision’, Corporate Rescue and Insolvency (ISSN 1756-2465) Volume 8.2 April 
(2015). 
121 Pottow (2007), supra n. 115.  
122 Ibid. See also Nita Ghei and Francesco Parisi, ‘Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum 
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order’, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1367, 1373 (2004), who support the 
view that "Uncertainty about which jurisdiction's law applies would actually reduce forum shopping." 
123 Thus the view that the COMI concept has been formulated much “stronger” (see Tirado, supra at 96 
p.18) is right when comparing it to its previous form; this is not the case, however, as regards its 
strength against forum shopping. 
124 Knowing a priory the do’s and don’ts applying in COMI determination, ‘forum shoppers’ have greater 
chances in effecting ‘eligible’ COMI shifts. 
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proposed methods125 for the duly notification of creditors about the relocation, may 
have more accurate results than it would have under the EU Insolvency Regulation.  
         It would be quite strange to assume that the Recast did not consider such a 
possibility when recasting COMI. Just to be fair, though, it did retain a certain degree of 
uncertainty in the final step of COMI determination; by reinforcing the ‘third parties 
perception’ criterion126 it imposes a last threshold of judicial scrutiny, since the former 
requires always ad hoc determination. In particular, even where a COMI shift is 
effected in accordance with the ‘look-back’ period requirement, the subjective obstacle 
of ‘creditors’ perception’ shall be further surpassed; ultimately, the relocation may not 
be regarded as an ‘honest’ and genuine COMI shift, if it is not perceived as such by the 
debtor’s creditors.  
         Taking all the above factors into consideration, perhaps it is more apt to assume 
that the Recast was aware of the concept’s vulnerability against forum shopping, as a 
consequence of the increased certainty of the former. This could be therefore one of 
the reasons why the Recast decided to change its view regarding forum shopping itself. 
 
2. Taking A Fresh View On Forum Shopping 
 
       After a decade of severe criticism against EIR’s COMI, it can be said that the 
Recast’s reforms thereon were more or less anticipated. What was least expected 
however127, is the new stance that the Recast adopts towards forum shopping per se; 
through an implied distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forum shopping, the Recast 
departs from what previously used to be common knowledge, i.e. that forum shopping 
in general is prohibited under EU law. 
       When comparing the texts of the original Insolvency Regulation and of the Recast 
a sticking difference come to surface as regards the definition of COMI. Interestingly 
enough, the context of recital (4) in EIR is quite different from the corresponding recital 
(5) in Recast. More specifically, the Recast incorporates an additional evaluative 
criterion, which drastically alters the former definition. In addition to the requirements 
set in EIR, in Recast the transfer of assets or judicial proceedings to other jurisdictions 
constitutes forum shopping, where such a transfer is “to the detriment of the general 
                                                 
125 See recital (28) of Recast, wherein examples of due information to creditors are provided.  
126 See the “ascertainable by third parties” requirement of art. 3(1) and the guidelines in recital (28) of 
Recast.  
127 Although the view that forum shopping need not always be seen as bad, has been expressed in the 
past (see infra. note 131), it was not expected that such a ‘confession’ would be formally inserted into 
EU law. 
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body of creditors”128. Therefore, an a contrario interpretation reveals that forum 
shopping need not be prevented where it somehow benefits the debtor’s creditors. 
         Taking this position a step further, recital (29) of the Recast explicitly sets the 
goal of preventing “fraudulent or abusive” forum shopping, whereas the EIR did not 
contain such a clarification129. Therefore, the use of such wording leads to the following 
assumptions; first, that the Recast purports to detach any negative meaning from the 
term ‘forum shopping’ as such130; second and foremost, that it draws an implicit 
distinction between ‘detrimental’ and ‘positive’ forum shopping, which can effectivelly 
alter the landscape of transnational insolvencies within the Union.  
         As radical as it may seem, such a distinction of forum shopping was actually 
discussed much earlier in commentaries and relevant case law131. In particular, it has 
been speculated that perhaps forum shopping is “not all that bad”132 when seen as a 
natural “optimisation of procedural possibilities”133, and that it may not amount to abuse 
of EU Insolvency Law when “dealing with anticommons problems and their related 
hold-out behaviour”134. Nonetheless, the acknowledgement that a ‘legitimate’ kind of 
forum shopping may exist, is an entirely different thing when expressed merely as an 
opinion from being elevated into the status of a provision of EU law. In this regard, the 
Recast does implement a revolutionary framework within which the future of 
bankruptcy forum shopping is to be redesigned. 
         Although the rationale behind such a distinction is understandable, the Recast’s 
implied distinction raises several questions which, unfortunately, are left unanswered. 
The primary question as such refers to what the actual meaning of  “fraudulent or 
abusive” forum shopping is and under which criteria the detrimental effects on creditors 
                                                 
128 Recital (5) of Recast repeats the exact same wording of recital (4) of EIR, while adding the 
aforementioned phrase at the end. As a consequence, the material definition of forum shopping under 
the Recast is entirely different from the one contained in EIR. 
129 In EIR the only reference to forum shopping was contained in recital (4), where nothing implied that a 
positive type of forum shopping may exist. 
130 Indeed, the term forum shopping is commonly perceived to have a negative sense. See for example 
Lord Simon in ‘The Atlantic star’ (1974) AC 436-437, who comments that forum shopping is a “dirty 
word”. 
131 See McCormack, supra n. 86 and Opinion of A.G. Colomer in Case C-1/04, Susanne Staubitz-Schrieber, 
2006 E.C.R. 1-701. Colomer opined that “in the absence of legal uniformity (…) that phenomenon must 
be accepted as a natural consequence which is not open to criticism .... Forum shopping is merely the 
optimisation of procedural possibilities and it results from the existence of more than one available 
forum, which is no way unlawful”. C-1/04 - Staubitz-Schreiber, Opinion A.G. Colomer 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:500 
132 See Pottow, supra n. 115 p. 814 
133 Opinion of A.G.Colomer, supra n. 131 
134 See de Weijs, Roelf Jakob and Breeman, Martijn, ‘Comi-Migration: Use or Abuse of European 
Insolvency Law?’, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-38 (2013); Centre for the Study of 
European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2013-07 (2013). 
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are to be assessed135. Adversely, equally important is to ascertain which relocations 
should fall under the ‘legitimate’ forum shopping ambit, which as such may escape the 
preventive scope of EU Insolvency Law. 
 
3. Reading Between The Lines Of The Implied Distinction 
 
         In the absence of any relevant guidelines within the Recast, providing a 
straightforward answer to the said questions is not an easy task. As various 
considerations are in place, it has been argued136 that it is difficult to ascertain whether 
the COMI shift is fraudulent and whether such relocation amounts to abuse, especially 
in cases where the relocation is to the detriment of some creditors but at the same time 
to the benefit of some others137. Therefore, as J. Armour points out, it is difficult to draw 
“the dividing line between good and bad forum shopping”138.  
           In the attempt to determine ‘bad’ forum shopping, regard should be given to the 
meaning of the terms ‘fraudulent’ and ‘abusive’; whereas the former refers to non-
genuine relocations of COMI -or even to intentional misrepresentation of facts related 
to the actual debtor’s COMI139-, the latter is more difficult to determine. Abuse requires 
the crossing of a threshold while exercising a right provided by law, so that it ends up 
frustrating or cancelling the exercise of other parties’ rights. Indeed, it should not be 
forgotten that COMI migration is an expression of the fundamental freedom of 
establishment as portrayed in art. 49 TFEU140; hence, COMI relocation is in principle 
the exercise of a fundamental right, which nonetheless may amount to an abuse where 
it effectively deprives creditors of the exercise of their rights. 
           There have been several proposals as to which criteria and tests would be 
suitable in determining forum shopping as abusive; some commentators suggested the 
“creditors’ unanimous consensus”141 criterion or the “assets maximization”142 test as 
                                                 
135 Mevorach had foreseen that such an issue would arise with the advent of the Recast Regulation. See 
Mevorach, I. ‘Forum Shopping In Times Of Crisis: A Directors' Duties Perspective’, European Company 
and Financial Law Review, 10 (4).(2013) ISSN 1613- 2548, p. 532.   
136 See Eidenmüller, H. ‘Abuse Of Law In The Context Of European Insolvency Law’ European Company 
and Financial Law Review 1, (2009) 11. 
137 A Walters and A Smith, ‘Bankruptcy Tourism Under The EC Regulation On Insolvency Proceedings: A 
View From England and Wales’ IIR 2010, 19(3) 181. 
138 See J Armour, ‘Abuse of European Insolvency Law? A Discussion’ in R de la Feria & S Vogenauer (eds), 
Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law? Oxford University Press (2011). 
139 See Mevorach, supra n. 135. This scenario refers to fraudulent manipulation as to the actual location 
of the debtor’s COMI, while no actual relocation takes place.  
140 Supra at. 42 
141 P Paschalidis, ‘Freedom of Establishment and Private International Law for Corporations’, Oxford 
University Press (2012), p. 221. The author suggests that a COMI shift is not abusive if all creditors have 
consented thereto. 
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proper indicators. Nevertheless, in the absence of formal judicial recognition of such 
tests, ‘detrimental’ forum shopping practices, for the purposes of EU law, are generally 
considered in literature non-genuine relocations of COMI which are driven by the 
debtor’s “self-serving” intention143 to hide assets, escape from liabilities, or make use of 
more favourable bankruptcy laws at the expense of its creditors or a particular group 
thereof.  
            In light of the above then, what should be regarded as ‘legitimate’ forum 
shopping? In the absence of any explicit guidelines within EU law, its context can only 
be determined by contrast to ‘detrimental’ forum shopping. The leading view is that a 
legitimate type of forum shopping could presumably refer to relocations of COMI for the 
benefit of the general body of creditors as a whole144. The most prominent example in 
literature of such a positive COMI shift is the relocation for the purpose to maximize the 
value of assets, by making use of more favourable bankruptcy laws or procedures145. 
This however represents a narrow, “proceduralist” approach to insolvency law146, 
according to which insolvency proceedings have the sole purpose of collective return 
maximization.  
          The novel, debt-restructuring oriented regime of the Recast147, however, 
suggests that the ambit of what may be considered as legitimate forum shopping 
should be much broader148. Within the new mandate to rescue “economically viable but 
distressed businesses”149, the positive forum shopping notion should refer to COMI 
relocations that offer opportunities for the salvation of business, debt-reorganization 
and effective continuation of economic activities150, while bearing in mind also social 
considerations, such as the preservation of employment and reinforcement of 
entrepreneurship.  
           It seems, however, that this distinction can only make sense when perceived 
through the creditors’ point of view.  If creditors were to be offered adequate protection, 
                                                                                                                                               
142 Eidenmüller (supra n. 136, 16) suggests forum shopping may not be deemed abusive where the 
relocation results in increasing the net assets of the debtor. 
143 Mevorach, supra n. 135. 
144 Ibid. As Mevorach aptly points out “relocations aimed at benefiting a section of the stakeholders 
must be regarded detrimental”. 
145 See, for example, McCormack supra n. 86 and Eidenmüller supra n. 136. 
146 See TH Jackson, ‘The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law’, Harvard University Press (1986) 
147 See Chapter III. 3  
148 This is also aligned with the “traditionalist” approach to insolvency law, according to which the 
former should seek to balance and accommodate a wider range of interests. See Jackson, supra at 146 
149 Recital (10) of the Recast. 
150 See Finch, supra n. 107. 
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then shifts in COMI could become more flexible, as national courts would be more 
readily inclined to categorize them under the ‘positive’ forum shopping notion.  
 
4. Future Prospects For Forum Shopping Within The Union 
 
          From the analysis presented above, it becomes apparent that there is a cohesive 
link between the implied distinction in forum shopping and the Recast’s new focus on 
debt restructuring objectives. After all, the latter could not be effectively accomplished 
within a legal framework that indiscreetly inhibits COMI relocations, irrespective of the 
underlying motives and the aims pursued. Under this perspective, new prospects 
emerge for the future of bankruptcy forum shopping within the Union.  
           In particular, Recast’s new approach towards forum shopping is anticipated to 
provide increased flexibility in COMI shifts effected for the purpose of opening main 
insolvency proceedings. Forum shopping legitimization can effectively facilitate 
relocations that are indeed beneficial for the general body of creditors, but would 
otherwise not be effected due to reluctance or because they would be deemed as 
unforeseeable risk on the part of insolvent debtors. However, it can be validly assumed 
that the wider impact of the new regime will be identified in the pre-insolvency stage; by 
encompassing pre-insolvency proceedings into its scope, the Recast offers the 
opportunity for an efficient ‘legitimization’ of COMI shifts taking place at a time period 
prior to insolvency, which is very crucial in terms of insolvency prevention.  
          Hence, by enabling debtors, who honestly pursue reorganizational objectives, to 
be lawfully subjected to more favourable laws already from an early stage151, the 
Recast can effectively contribute to the economic recovery and sustainability objectives 
envisaged within the Europe 2020 growth strategy152. Furthermore, such forum 
shopping legitimization is aligned with the internationally accepted ‘directors’ duties 
regime’153 promulgated by UNCITRAL. As Mevorach points out, it would be “consistent 
with the general benchmarks regarding directors’ obligations in the period leading up to 
insolvency”154.  
         Within this novel context, it is speculated that bankruptcy forum shopping will not 
only diminish, but actually increase in the years to come. On the basis of the previous 
arguments, this is not a bad outcome when referring to ‘legitimate’ forum shopping; it is 
                                                 
151 See Commission Recommendation supra at 105 and also recital (10) of the Recast. 
152 Supra n. 104  
153 See UNCITRAL ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part four: Directors’ obligations in the period 
approaching insolvency’ United Nations New York (2013) 
154 See Mevorach, supra n. 135 
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probably fair to say that, in the context of enhancing the efficiency of transnational 
insolvency proceedings, the Recast seems to essentially promote such beneficial 
relocations.  
         Nonetheless, there is always the threat that such flexible framework may give rise 
to abusive forum shopping as well, only this time under the disguise of pursuing 
legitimate aims. This places once again the burden on courts to scrutinize COMI 
relocations on an ad hoc basis and formulate the necessary and appropriate criteria, 
according to which the essence of ‘legitimate’ forum shopping will be more clearly -and 
perhaps more strictly- defined. 
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Conclusions 
         In contrast to the widespread criticism against the initial concept of COMI, the 
Recast’s amendments introduced therein have generally received positive reviews. The 
new Regulation rectifies some obvious defaults of the previous regime, while setting 
the basis for enhanced legal certainty and predictability across the Union. On the other 
hand, the significantly enlarged scope and redefined objectives of the Recast, can 
effectively redesign the overall purpose of EU Insolvency law. Such an improved legal 
framework is expected to enhance the efficiency of transnational insolvency 
proceedings and facilitate companies in legitimately pursuing viable solutions instead of 
being faced only with the option of liquidation. 
        Even more importantly though, the Recast adopts a more realistic and streamlined 
approach towards forum shopping, which better reflects the state and needs of current 
economic reality. By accepting that a ‘legitimate’ type of forum shopping may exist, the 
new regime sets forth a revolutionary framework within which COMI migration is to be 
perceived. In this regard, it creates new prospects for the future of bankruptcy forum 
shopping within the Union.  
        Yet, the Recast remains particularly silent as regards the nature and scope of 
such ‘positive’ relocations, a fact that hints a conscious choice; the Recast simply 
points towards the proposed direction, whereas the optimum route to be taken shall be 
further specified by national courts. The latter bear also the burden to unmask possible 
attempts of abusive forum shopping, presenting themselves as legitimate ones. Within 
this context, only time and international practice will tell whether the choice to offer 
such a window of opportunity was a wise one.  
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